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Abstract
This paper derives – considering a Gaussian setting – closed form solutions
of the statistics that Adrian and Brunnermeier [3] and Acharya et al. [1] have
suggested as measures of systemic risk to be attached to individual banks. The
statistics equal the product of statistic specific β-coefficients with the mean cor-
rected Value at Risk. Hence, the measures of systemic risks are closely related
to well known concepts of financial economics. Another benefit of the analysis
is that it is revealed how the concepts are related to each other. Also, it may be
relatively “easy” to convince the regulators to consider a closed form solution,
especially so if the statistics involved are well known and can easily be commu-
nicated to the financial community.
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requirements, Basel III
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1 Introduction
Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) are established measures of riskiness
of e.g. financial institutions (e.g. McNeil et al. [15]). However, these numbers measure
the riskiness of an institution in “isolation”. The financial crisis taught everybody
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www.htw-berlin.de/organisation/?typo3state=persons&lsfid=8754 or www.mathfred.de. I
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Cologne), Barbara Ru¨diger-Mastandrea (University Wuppertal), Eric Schaanning (ETH) and the
participants of the Rhein Wupper Seminar on Financial Engineering and Risk Management and the
Fachsysmposium “Das neue Gesicht der Regulierung im Finanzmarkt” of the University Cologne for
comments.
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that it is not a good idea to measure the riskiness of financial institutions as if these
institutions could be analyzed in isolation. Indeed, systemic risk, how to measure
it and how to allocate responsibilities is currently an energetically researched topic
of economics (e.g. Acharya et al. [1], [2], Adrian and Brunnermeier [3], [4], Dreh-
mann and Tarashev [8], Galati and Moessner [10], Gauthier, Lehar and Souissi [11],
Huang, Zhou and Zhu [13], Tarashev, Borio, Tsatsaronis [17], Zhou [18]). Hellwig [12]
is a early contribution stressing the importance of systemic risk analysis. Crockett
[7] is frequently cited as the seminal contribution stressing the need to augment a
microprudential analysis with a macroprudential one. Concerning the approach of this
paper Lehar [9] should be considered as seminal. He stresses the similarity of the
macroprudential approach to the quantitative analysis of a risk manager supervising a
portfolio of risks.
This paper is based on two influential recent contributions: Adrian and Brunner-
meier [3], [4] and Acharya et al. [1], [2]. Adrian and Brunnermeier have stressed the
need to analyze systemic risk and have done so in a very practical manner. They
explicitly develop a statistic that could play a practical role when fixing regulatory
capital. Adrian and Brunnermeier argue very convincingly that incentives of banks
would be distorted if regulation were based on Value at Risk not taking into account
the systemic risk linked to a bank. Indeed, a bank might be incentivated to assume
to much systemic risk if this risk is not addressed by regulation. Acharya et al. [1]
elaborate on the necessity to use regulation to internalize externalities related to sys-
temic risk. They argue that two kinds of externalities are relevant (Acharya et al. [1],
p. 286). First, a failing bank may trigger spillover effects that the bank does not take
into account when chosing its strategy and business model. Indeed, in case of a crisis
“liquidity spiral, leading to depressed asset prices and a hostile funding environment,
pulling others down and thus leading to further price drops, funding illiquidity, and so
on” (see also Brunnermeier and Pedersen [5]. Second, in case of a systemic crisis, there
is no private solver – an institution that could for example buy a failing bank – as all
private actors are suffering in a systemic crisis. Hence, the cost of solving the problem
are socialized (e.g. via a subsidized mergers or subsidized capital injections).
Adrian and Brunnermeier [4] consider the Value of Risk of a group A of financial
institutions given that a specific institution i has hit its VaRi (CoVaRAi). To measure
the systemic risk to be attached to bank i, they suggest
∆CoVaRAi = CoVaRAi − CoVaRmAi
= VaR(XA|Xi = VaR(Xi))−VaR(XA|Xi = median(Xi)).
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Obviously, CoVaR depends on the dependencies that the other institutions have with
the state of the institution i, especially the dependencies at the left (risky) tail.
In this paper the approach of Adrian and Brunnermeier is studied in a simple
stochastic Gaussian setting. Within this framework the intuition of ∆CoVaR can
easily be grasped and a closed form solution can be derived. The approach is very
transparent as it can easily be linked to standard concepts of risk management viz. β-
coefficient and Value at Risk (VaR). The approach is as follows: We consider a system
of financial institutions S = {i}∪A, where we single out one of these institutions (viz.
the institution i). We derive the very simple closed form representation of the systemic
risk attached to bank i (Delta Collateral Value at Risk):
∆CollVaRAi = −Φ−1(α) ΣAi√
Σi
= βAiVaR
mean(Xi),
∆CollVaRAi = CoVaRAi −VaRA(XA|Xi = E(Xi)),
βAi =
cov(Xi, XA)
var(Xi)
,
VaRmean(Xi) = VaR(Xi)− E(Xi),
where α is the VaR-threshold, Φ is the standard normal distribution function and ΣAi
is the covariance of the returns of i and A. We derive a series of closed form solutions
of statistics related to systemic risk. Table 1 provides a summary. Note that there is
only a minor difference to Adrian and Brunnermeier [4]. We use the expected value
instead of the median to define the condition of the conditional Value at risk.
We also have a closed form solution if instead of Value of Risk Expected Shortfall
is considered:
∆CollESAi = −φ(Φ
−1(α))
1− α
ΣAi√
Σi
= βAi ES
mean(Xi),
where φ is the density of the standard normal distribution.
Adrian and Brunnermeier [4] analyze ∆CoVaR empirically using quantile regres-
sion, where explanatory variables are taken into account to produce forecasts of CoVaR,
which is of crucial importance for a regulator. The purpose of this paper is threefold:
Improve intuition, offer closed form solutions in a specific stochastic framework and
reveal how the concepts are related to each other.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 the Gaussian setting is in-
troduced and the closed form solutions for several statistics relevant for systemic risk
are derived. It is shown that all statistics are closely related to well-known concepts
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of finance viz. β and VaR. Also, the relationships between the statistics is derived.
Section 3 summarizes.
2 Systemic Risk in a Gaussian setting
2.1 The stochastic framework and the statistics analyzed
We focus on the following problem: There is a system of banks, we single out one of
these banks and we aim to measure the systemic risk to be attached to the bank singled
out. Such a perspective is quite natural for a supervisor, who actually will study the
risk of bank on its own first and augment this narrow risk analysis by a systemic risk
analysis. The aim of the paper is to derive simple formulae of quantitative measures
of systemic risk to be attached to the bank focused. We denote the bank focused by
i. A refers to the complete banking system without the bank i, i.e. S = {i} ∪A is the
system under investigation.
In the following a vector (Xi, XA)
′ of a bank-i respectively group-A related statistic
will be considered. Deliberately, we leave indefinite what statistic is considered; one
may think of Profit/Loss, Return, Assets, Equity, etc.
Maintained Assumption: We assume that Xi, XA are jointly Gaussian with expected
values µi, µA and variance-covariance matrix
Σ =
(
Σi ΣAi
ΣAi ΣA
)
.
In the following and without further mentioning, we are going to assume that this
assumption holds. Of course it is this assumption that allows us to derive closed form
solutions. It is well known that many statistics in finance are not Gaussian (for a
survey see Rockinger et al. [16]). Hence, the closed form solutions derived later should
be used with much care. But the benefits of transparency and intuition that result
from a closed form solution justify to also study the Gaussian case.
The following lemma offers a closed form solution of the conditional expected value
and of the conditional variance (see McNeil et al. [15], p. 68).
Lemma 1: The conditional expected value of XA given that Xi = x is
E(XA|Xi = x) = µA + ΣAi
Σi
(x− µi)
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and the conditional variance equals
VAR(XA|Xi = x) = ΣA − Σ
2
Ai
Σi
.
Note, that the expected value ofXA depends linearly on realization x ofXi, whereas the
conditional variance does not depend on x. Note, that the variance of the conditioned
random variable is smaller than its unconditional variance if Xi an XA are positively
correlated (let us call this effect “variance reduction by conditioning”).
The second lemma of great use for our purpose endows us with a closed form solu-
tion of the Value at Risk of a normally distributed variable (see McNeil et al. [15], p.
39)).
Lemma 2: The Value at Risk of a normally distributed variable X is given by
VaR(X) = µ− ϕ ·
√
Σ , ϕ = Φ−1(α),
where Φ−1 is the inverse of the standard normal distribution and α is the probability
threshold used to define the Value at Risk.
Remark: For clarification, the parameter α is relatively close to 1 (say 0.999) – and
hence ϕ is a positive real number (ϕ = 3.09 if α = 0.999).
List of Statistics: The aim of this paper is to study statistics that measure systemic
risk to be attached to a bank. We will derive closed form solutions of three such
statistics and also study the relationships between these statistics:
∆CollVaRAi = VaR(XA|Xi = VaR(Xi))− VaR(XA|Xi = E(Xi)),
∆CondVaRSi = VaR(XS|Xi = VaR(Xi))−VaR(XS|Xi = E(Xi)),
∆ContrVaRiS = VaR(Xi|XS = VaR(XS))−VaR(Xi|XS = E(XS)).
In each case a stressed situation is compared with an unstressed situation. The stressed
situation is modeled by using the VaR in the condition of the conditional Value of Risk,
whereas the unstressed situation is modeled by using the expected value to fix the
condition of the conditional VaR. Note, that by studying the difference of conditioned
VaRs the variance reduction effect mentioned below lemma 1 cancels. This is indeed
very important, as otherwise misleading statistics would be generated.
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At the margin note, that the difference to ∆CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier is
merely the definition of the unstressed situation. Whereas in Adrian and Brunnermeier
[4] the median is used to define the condition, here the expected value is used. In a
Gaussian setting of course the difference disappears as median and expected value are
the same.
2.2 The closed form solution
We first apply the two lemmata to derive a closed form solution of the VaR of A
given that bank i has hit its VaR (we have to be careful here: Σi denotes the variance
and hence
√
Σi is the standard deviation needed in the formula for VaR.), i.e. of
CoVaRAi = VaR(XA|Xi = VaR(Xi)). We obtain
CoVaRAi = µA +
ΣAi
Σi
(
µi −
√
Σi · ϕ− µi
)
− ϕ
√
ΣA − Σ
2
Ai
Σi
= µA − ϕ ΣAi√
Σi
− ϕ
√
ΣA − Σ
2
Ai
Σi
,
The sum of the first two terms is the conditional expected value and the third is the
conditional standard deviation. Lemma 1 is used to calculate the conditional VaR of
XA. Lemma 2 is used twice. First when calculating conditional VaR of XA and second
when calculating the VaR of Xi. We are now in the position to calculate the closed
form solution of
∆CollVaRAi = CoVaRAi − CoVaReAi,
where
CoVaReAi = VaR(XA|Xi = E(Xi))
= µA +
ΣAi
Σi
(µi − µi)− ϕ
√
ΣA − Σ
2
Ai
Σi
= µA − ϕ
√
ΣA − Σ
2
Ai
Σi
.
We observe that most terms – viz. the conditional variance and the unconditional
expected value – cancel out if we calculate the difference CoVaRAi−CoVaReAi, so that
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we obtain
∆CollVaRAi = −ϕ ΣAi√
Σi
= −Φ−1(α) ΣAi√
Σi
and mutatis mutandis
∆CollESAi = −φ(Φ
−1(α))
1− α
ΣAi√
Σi
.
Proposition 1: Delta Collateral Value of Risk equals
∆CollVaRAi =
(
ΣAi
Σi
)
· (−ϕ
√
Σi)
= βAi · VaRmean(Xi).
The interpretation is as follows: Delta Collateral Value at Risk equals the regression co-
efficient βAi =
(
ΣAi
Σi
)
times the impulse VaRmean(Xi). In other words: The calamities
of bank i measured by its own mean-corrected Value at Risk VaRmean(Xi) are translated
into systemic calamities via the regression coefficient βAi.
Remark 1: If i is in a stressed situation A is also pulled down (if i and A are
correlated). The statistic ∆CollVaRAi captures this effect actually through the change
in expected value:
∆CollVaRAi = E(XA|Xi = VaR(Xi))− µA.
Also note that
∆CollVaRAi = βAi · VaRmean(Xi) = cov(Xi, XA)
var(Xi)
· VaRmean(Xi)
= −ρ · std(Xi) · std(XA)
std(Xi)2
· ϕ · std(Xi) = −ϕ · ρ · std(XA),
where ρ = corr(Xi, XA). Note, that the size of i has no effect on ∆CollVaR
Ai.
∆CollVaRAi is affected by the size of A and the correlation. Hence, a small i may
be systemically relevant if A is highly correlated with i.
Note that in the process of supervising a bank, the statistic VaRi,mean is calculated
anyway. All that is additionally needed to implement the formulae derived in this
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paper is the covariance cov(Xi, XS) (or βSi or βiS). These statistics are relatively well
understood and relatively easy to communicate to banks and to the market.
So far we have considered the system S = {i} ∪A. We have singled out the bank i
and studied the CoVaR attached to this bank. In this context CoVaR is best translated
as Collateral Value at Risk: We consider the state of A – the others – if i is under
stress. We thereby focus on the spillover (or the externality) attached to bank i exerted
on the group A. Obviously, it is also of interest to study the shape of the complete
system S if i is under stress. In other words, we are as much interested to study the
stochastic vector (Xi, Xi + XA)
′ as we are interested to analyze the vector (Xi, XA)
′.
In the appendix we calculate variance-covariance matrix of (Xi, Xi+XA)
′ = (Xi, XS)
′:
ΣiS =
(
Σi ΣiA + Σi
ΣiA + Σi Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA
)
.
Using this we find that the conditional Value at Risk of the system given that Xi has
hit the value x is
VaR(XS|Xi = x) = µS + ΣiA + Σi
Σi
(x− µi)
−ϕ
√
Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA − (ΣiA + Σi)
2
Σi
and consequently we have the
Proposition 2: Delta Conditional Value at Risk equals
∆CondVaRSi = VaR(XS|Xi = VaR(Xi))− VaR(XS|Xi = E(Xi))
= −ϕΣiA + Σi√
Σi
= βAiVaR
mean(Xi) + VaR
mean(Xi) = βSiVaR
mean(Xi).
Again, this is intuitive. It means that the overall risk attached to bank i consists
of the bank’s own risk plus its collateral risk. If bank i hits its VaR the system is
directly pulled down as i is a member of the group: consequently we have the term
−ϕ√Σi = VaRmean(Xi) (which is the mean corrected VaR). In addition to this we have
an indirect negative effect (at least in the more likely case that i and A are positively cor-
related) as the other banks are simultaneously drawn down: −ϕ ΣAi√
Σi
= βAiVaR
mean(Xi).
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So far we followed Adrian and Brunnermeier and considered the VaR of the system
given that a bank has hit its VaR. As an alternative we may consider the VaR of bank
i given that the financial system has hit its VaR, i.e.
VaR(Xi|XS = VaR(XS)).
This perspective is very close to the perspective that Acharya et al. [1] and Brown-
less and Engle [6] have recommended. They suggest to use a statistic that features
prominently in risk management viz. the VaR-contribution:
VaR-ContributioniS = E(Xi|XS = VaR(XS))
(Mc Neil, et. al. [15], p. 258). VaR contribution defines the allocation principle if
Value at Risk is used to allocate economic capital. The problem of capital allocation
is to allocate the aggregate economic capital – defined via a risk measure ρ(L) – to the
risk factors Li, i = 1, .., k of L =
∑
i=1..k Li (McNeil et al. [15], p. 256ff). The idea
of the VaR-Contribution: If the financial system has hit its VaR what is the contribu-
tion of i to this loss. In other words, if we were to recapitalize a system (a portfolio)
because of a systemic crisis (because of a joint loss of many assets) what is the share
attributable to a specific institution (asset).
Proposition 3: The difference between the stressed and the normal situation is
∆ContrVaRiS = VaR(Xi|XS = VaR(XS))
−VaR(Xi|XS = E(XS))
= −ϕ ΣiA + Σi√
Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA
= −ϕΣiA + Σi√
ΣS
=
ΣiA + Σi
ΣS
(−ϕ)
√
ΣS
= βiSVaR
mean(XS).
where we use
E(Xi|XS = x) = µi + ΣiA + Σi
Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA
(x− µS),
VaR(Xi|XS = x) = Σi − (ΣiA + Σi)
2
Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA
.
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Hence
VaR(Xi|XS = VaR(XS)) = µi − ΣiA + Σi
Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA
ϕ
√
Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA
−ϕ
√
Σi − (ΣiA + Σi)
2
Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA
= µi − ϕ ΣiA + Σi√
Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA
−ϕ
√
Σi − (ΣiA + Σi)
2
Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA
Several remarks are appropriate:
Remark 2 (Aggregation): A useful feature of ∆ContrVaRiS is that the sum of the
systemic risks attached to i and A equals aggregate risk. First observe
βiS + βAS =
ΣiA + Σi
ΣS
+
ΣiA + ΣA
ΣS
=
Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA
ΣS
=
ΣS
ΣS
= 1.
Hence
∆ContrVaRiS +∆ContrVaRAS = VaRmean(XS).
Remark 3: The VaR-Contribution – a conditional expected value – equals the uncon-
ditional expected value plus ∆ContrVaR:
VaR-ContributioniS = µi +∆ContrVaR
iS.
Indeed, using Lemma 1 we have
E(Xi|XS = VaR(XS)) = µi − ΣiA + Σi
Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA
ϕ
√
Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA
= µi +∆ContrVaR
iS
or
∆ContrVaRiS = E(Xi|XS = VaR(XS))− µi.
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Now, we can conpare this statistic with
∆CollVaRAi = E(XA|Xi = VaR(Xi))− µA
In both cases a change of an expected value is considered. Whereas in the top-down
approach one considers the change of expected value of i given stress in the system,
in the bottom up approach the perspective is reversed as one considers the expected
value of the system given stress at i.
Remark 4: It comes as no surprise that in a Gaussian framework risk related statistics
refer to covariance and variance. Indeed, suppose that the standard deviation is used
to measure the aggregate risk of L =
∑
i=1..k Li. McNeil et al. [15], p. 258 show that
ACstdi =
cov(L, Li)
std(L)
is the allocation principle for this risk measure. We observe
(−ϕ) · ACstdi = ∆ContrVaRiS.
Remark 5: Furthermore, note that∑
i
VaR-ContributioniS = VaR(XS),
whereas
∆ContrVaRiS +∆ContrVaRAS = VaRmean(XS).
This is as intuition suggests, as the statistics ContrVaRxy equal conditional expecta-
tions corrected with unconditional expectations.
The next result relates the statistics based on Adrian and Brunnermeier [4] to
that of Proposition 3. Indeed, the formula for ∆ContrVaRiS closely resembles that of
∆CondVaRSi. The only difference is the denominator. Whereas it is 1
std(Xi)
in case of
∆CondVaRSi it is 1
std(XS)
in the case of ∆ContrVaRiS.
Proposition 4: The statistics ∆CondVaRSi and ∆ContrVaRiS are closely related:
∆CondVaRSi =
(√
ΣS√
Σi
)
·∆ContrVaRiS
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or
∆CondVaRSi√
ΣS
=
∆ContrVaRiS√
Σi
.
Using Proposition 4 we can quickly find an additivity result for the Conditional Value
at Risk.
Proposition 5: The weighted sum of Conditional Values at Risk equals aggregated
risk: (√
Σi√
ΣS
)
∆CondVaRSi +
(√
ΣA√
ΣS
)
∆CondVaRSA
= ∆ContrVaRiS +∆ContrVaRAS = VaRmean(XS).
This result mirrors the observation of remark 2. The sum of systemic risks attributed
to the several banks equals mean corrected aggregate risk. However in case of the
Conditional Value at Risk it is a weighted sum, where the weights reflect the relative
risk of the institutions. Proposition 5 shows how the top-down of Acharya et al. [1]
is related to the bottom-up approach of Adrian and Brunnermeier (see Drehmann and
Tarashev [8] for a discussion of top-down and bottom-up).
3 Conclusion
We have derived a battery of closed form solutions of statistics of systemic risk calcu-
lated in a Gaussian setting. The formulae allow us to relate the systemic risk statisics
to well known concepts of financial economics viz. VaR and β-coefficient. We also
derive a collection of result that reveal how the different statistics of systemic risk are
related to each other. For sake of transparency a table of the formulae is provided.
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Table 1: Collecting Results
∆CollVaRAi = VaR(XA|Xi = VaR(Xi))−VaR(XA|Xi = E(Xi))
= βAiVaR
mean(Xi) = ρ · ϕ · std(XA)
= E(XA|Xi = VaR(Xi))− µA
∆CondVaRSi = VaR(XS|Xi = VaR(Xi))−VaR(XS|Xi = E(Xi))
= βAiVaR
mean(Xi) + VaR
mean(Xi) = βSiVaR
mean(Xi)
∆ContrVaRiS = VaR(Xi|XS = VaR(XS))− VaR(Xi|XS = E(XS))
= βiSVaR
mean(Xi) = E(Xi|XS = VaR(XS))− µi
∆CondVaRSi =
(√
ΣS√
Σi
)
·∆ContrVaRiS
VaRmean = ∆ContrVaRiS +∆ContrVaRAS
VaRmean =
(√
Σi√
ΣS
)
∆CondVaRSi +
(√
ΣA√
ΣS
)
∆CondVaRSA
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Appendix 1
In addition to the stochastic vector (Xi, XA)
′ we here analyze the vector (Xi, Xi+XA)
′.
Note that
Xi +XA = (1 1)
(
Xi
XA
)
.
Hence, we can use the formula (3.13) of McNeil et al. ([15], 67) and obtainE(Xi+XA) =
µi + µA and
ΣS = (1 1)Σ
(
1
1
)
= (1 1)
(
Σi + ΣAi
ΣAi + ΣA
)
= Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA.
Furthermore, the covariance of XS = XA +Xi and Xi can be calculated:
cov(XA +Xi, Xi) = ΣiA + Σi.
Consequently the variance-covariance matrix of the vector (Xi, Xi +XA)
′ is given by
Σ =
(
Σi ΣiA + Σi
ΣiA + Σi Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA
)
.
Equipped with these equations we can calculate the Value at Risk of the system XS
VaR(S) = µS − ϕ
√
Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA.
We also obtain the conditional VaR using the formulae of McNeil et. al ([15], 68). We
note that
E(XS|Xi = x) = µS + ΣiA + Σi
Σi
(x− µi)
and
var(XS|Xi = x) = Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA − (ΣiA + Σi)
2
Σi
.
Consequently, we have that the conditional value at risk of XS if Xi = x is given by
VaR(XS|Xi = x) = µS + ΣiA + Σi
Σi
(x− µi)
−ϕ
√
Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA − (ΣiA + Σi)
2
Σi
15
and we have
CoVaRiS = µS − ΣiA + Σi
Σi
ϕ
√
Σi − ϕ
√
Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA − (ΣiA + Σi)
2
Σi
= µS − ϕΣiA + Σi√
Σi
− ϕ
√
Σi + 2ΣiA + ΣA − (ΣiA + Σi)
2
Σi
.
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